Fed up with Ads? Install Dainik Bhaskar app for news without ads
13 minutes ago
- Copy link
It is necessary to say the harsh truth in view of eastern Ladakh in concerned eyes that Prime Minister Narendra Modi made the same strategic mistake in the first five years of his tenure as Jawaharlal Nehru had done. At the same time, we will also explain why Modi's mistake is half that of Nehru's 1955-62 mistake.
We are making a well-known belief that when Modi came to power with absolute majority in 2014, he was confident that there would be no war in his era. Once you become a part of the global system and the interests of countries are tied to each other's bond prices, then there is no fight between them. When countries become important partners of the global economy, as India and China have become, then war has more economic consequences than military. Since there will be no war, in Modi's six years, the percentage of defense budget in GDP has decreased instead of increasing. India cannot match China in military power in the near future. But China's economic bet on India has increased due to heavy trade surplus. By the summer of 2017, it looked like he would not be fooled into spoiling his own game until he rearranged Doklam. Initially, Modi extended his hand to both Pakistan and China. But soon he realized the mistake that the real power in Pakistan is not in the hands of the elected leader but in someone else. After this Modi made a strategic reform and put Pakistan in the slot of the eternal enemy. Uri, Pulwama-Balakot was evidence that this political ploy is effective. He took a different approach in the case of China. He invited President Xi Jinping to Gujarat. Modi then calculated that the attraction of private equations, deep friendships, benefits from trade and investment could eliminate the Chinese threat. But the Chinese army, by violating the LAC in Chumar of Ladakh, proved that China would not desist from its habit. Despite this, the summits were held one after the other.
Doklam was a warning, but Wuhan then reinforced the notion that there would be no direct military threat from China. Therefore, expenses on the army can still be deferred. But perhaps a new concern emerged, which accelerated the process of acquiring Rafale. Despite this, the number of aircraft to be acquired was raised to 36, while the Indian Air Force demanded a minimum of 65. And this demand was also made on the belief that there is no possibility of war. But it was a strategic mistake.
The Balakot attack and subsequent skirmishes gave the first warning that India had let its lead slip out of its hands. Although there was some acceleration in the development of infrastructure along the border, this was not being done with the main focus on China. This boom also did not come before April 20, until the Chinese army suffered a massive military incursion. Why did China do this? Did the reshuffling in Kashmir and the Indian claims of regaining Aksai China provoke it? Coming here, we raise our core issue that Modi made the same strategic mistake as Nehru did. Modi assumed that there would be no war yet and China would not try to be a threat to India by jeopardizing its economic interests. But why did we call it half the mistake of Nehru's mistake? Because it is reasonable to assume that a conventional war is almost impossible. But the reasons for which peace is guaranteed are not right.
India had to increase spending on defense after indefinitely swinging under the UPA rule for a decade. The condition of peace in this difficult region of ours is to maintain the power to punish Pakistan and maintain a warning to China. But both these strategies were weakened due to investment cuts on the military.
China has always been eyeing. Recall the principle of pressure diplomacy of Vajpayee-Brajesh Mishra. It also included a policy of decisive and punitive military domination of India over Pakistan. He also said that pressure diplomacy can be effective only when the threat of war is so real that we accept it as true.
It is possible that this is why China is doing all this with us in Ladakh. He is leveraging his military edge to pressure diplomacy. The bold reply given by the Indian Army in the Kailash region has shown that India is no longer a 1962 India. But after the recent defense agreement, when we make emergency purchases of costumes necessary for winter from the US, we are again making a gross mistake by making a gross miscalculation.
(These are the author's own views)